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Compensation for Non-Economic Loss, 
the Tort-Liability Insurance System, 
and the 21s t Century 
Roger C. HENDERSON 
Tort awards for non-economic loss have grown in an almost geometric 
progression in the United States since first recognized nearly 150 years ago. 
Not only have courts constantly expanded the areas in which claimants are 
permitted to recover pain and suffering awards, but at the same time they 
have liberalized the definition of pain and suffering itself This may be 
traced in part from the way the judicial system was designed after the 
American Revolution, the role of lawyers in the system, and the affluence 
of the country. Consequently, awards for non-economic loss have taken on 
ever increasing importance, an importance that does not bode well for the 
prospects for future adoptions of no-fault auto insurance plans that would 
curtail such recoveries. 
This article sketches historical influences on the tort-liability insu-
rance system and summarizes modern developments in the law of damages 
for non-economic loss in the United States. It then raises questions re-
garding the prospects for adoption of the federal Choice No-Fault Auto 
Reform Act now pending in the U.S. Congress, apian that would off er auto 
accident victims the choice of being compensated on a no-fault basis, while 
waiving their right to recover for pain and suffering. It concludes by 
offering a possible scenario of how future efforts to reform the tort-liability 
system in the United States may occur as we move into the 21st century. 
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Les indemnités pour préjudice moral ont connu une hausse exponen-
tielle aux États-Unis depuis la reconnaissance de ce préjudice il y a environ 
150 ans. Les tribunaux ont non seulement étendu les cas où de tels montants 
peuvent être réclamé,, mais ils ont également élargi la définition des 
notions de « souffrances et douleurs ». Cette évolution s'expiique en partie 
par l'organisation du système judiciaire après la Révolution américaine, 
par le rôle joué en ce domaine par les avocats et par le niveau de richesse 
du pays. En conséquence, les indemnités pour préjudice moral ont pris une 
place de plus en plus importanee en droit américain, place qui n 'augure rien 
de bon quant aux chances de voir adopter des régimes d'assurance auto-
moblle sans égard à la responsabilité qui réduiraient ces indemnités. 
Le présent texte donne un aperçu des facteurs qui ont historiquement 
influé sur le droit de l'assuranee responsabilité aux États-Unss et résume 
les développements plus récents en matière de compensation du préjudice 
mora.. L'auteur s'interroge ensuite sur les possibilités d'adoption d'une loi 
fédérale présentement à l'étude devant le Congrès américain, loi qui ac-
corde aux victimes de la route le droit d'être indemnisées sans égard à la 
responsabilité, en échange d'une renonciation préalabee au droit de récla-
mer une indemnité pour préjudice moral. Finalemen,, l'auteur met de 
l'avant des propositions de réforme envisageables en matière de respon-
sabilité civile aux États-Unis, à l'aube du 21e siècle. 
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In considering the topic of non-economic loss and the ramifications of 
the law under the current tort-liability insurance system, I could not help but 
be reminded of some of the things that I came to appreciate while teaching 
in England a few years ago. Mind you, I was teaching American students, 
but one of the courses that I offered dealt with the differences between the 
American and English systems of compensating accident victims, including 
those who sustain injuries in motor vehicle mishaps. I was fascinated at the 
time by some of the contrasts and, in ruminating about them, I believe they 
also are relevant today as we explore what might be categorized as one of 
the most — if not the most—metaphysical areas of the law. Indeed, the 
more I think about it, it is very strange that we continue to press towards 
a theoretical goal — one of restoring the victim to his or her preinjury 
status — that is largely unobtainable and often bankrupt in practice under 
the current system, at least in the United States. In fact, one might legiti-
mately ponder why the seemingly never ending quest in tort law to compen-
sate accident victims in ever more situations for « loss » which cannot be 
measured in economic terms has not come under more serious scrutiny than 
it already has. In view of the fact that we are about to enter a new century 
that has all the promise of being even more technologically and socially 
revolutionary than the one we are concluding, one ought to wonder why the 
legal system continues to pursue so doggedly a concept that originated in the 
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19th century. Like so many other things, perhaps the answer partly lies in the 
past. 
1. Vicissitudes of the Origins of Tort Law in North America 
When I ponder why things are the way they are in the realm of tort law 
in our two countries, there are a couple of things that occur to me. The most 
immediate is the origin of tort law in North America and the subsequent 
developments that occurred, developments largely based on happenstance. 
The other is more remote and involves forces mat collided in the distant 
past ; yet, the largely fortuitous effects are still being felt today in some 
respects. 
1.1 Taking the Present System for Granted 
In considering what might have been, one should not take the common 
law system—much less a system that attempts to adjust losses on the basis 
of fault—for granted. We might just as well have inherited a civil law 
system in our countries, with the possible result that today we would have 
more integration of the tort-liability insurance system and social insurance 
programs. Were this the case, we might have much greater emphasis on the 
latter, such as you see in European countries like France and Germany. Had 
it not been for the peculiar cultural mix of the Norman conquest and some 
of the ramifications of Anglo-Saxon perseverance in 11th century England, 
things might have taken a different turn. Or, perhaps the French or even the 
Spanish could have been victorious in later wars with Great Britain. Again, 
had it not been for Elizabeth I, Sir Frances Drake, and a little help from the 
weather, we might be eating a lot more paella today than we do. Or, to bring 
things a little closer to home, what if France had prevailed in the Seven 
Years' War, that part of which was fought in America from 1754 to 1763 
being known as the French and Indian War ? Had the British lost, the rest 
of Canada and for that matter, the United States too—might be speaking 
the same language that most people speak in this beautiful city. If so, would 
we have inherited a common law adversarial judicial system or would the 
system be more like what we find in European countries today ? 
I do not want to dwell on what might have been because that is not how 
things turned out, but it is useful to remind ourselves when we are asked to 
think about tort law as a mechanism for adjusting losses that our system is 
not premised on an eternal verity, but is largely the product or, perhaps even 
more remotely, the by-product of happenstance. Thus, when an individual 
asserts that the Anglo-American fault-based tort system can be traced back 
to the Code of Hammurabi or that it is rooted in the natural order of things, 
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we, at the very least, should be very skeptical of the person's sense of 
history and be mindful of the role that human foibles have played in making 
things what they are today. 
1.2 Reasonable Alternatives 
Things are the way they are because of the many quirks and vicissi-
tudes that often not only defy reason, but that clearly would not have come 
out the same if the forces of change had converged a little differently in time 
or manner. Some things may be indispensable to our particular form of 
democratic government — such as the right to vote, freedom of the press, 
and the writ of habeas corpus—but the tort system that we have today 
surely is not one of them. There are reasonable alternatives for compen-
sating accident victims and others who suffer harm atThe hands of third 
parties, and within each alternative there are other reasonable choices to be 
made, including those regarding the types of harm for which there should be 
recompense. In fact, I would suggest that the decision of the citizens of 
Quebec to adopt such a marked alternative to the tort system for compen-
sating auto accident victims is in large part attributable to their French 
cultural heritage. And, of course, the rest of Canada and the United States 
are tied more to their British heritage which definitely has had its effect on 
their respective legal systems 
1.3 Our Common Law Legacy 
We—and by that I mean those of us in the United States as well as in 
Canada—inherited many things, legal and otherwise, from England. Even 
though not all colonists were from England—as those who live in Quebec 
well know — as it turns out much of what endures in our legal system is 
traceable to that country, traceable either because our ancestors embraced 
the British legal system or rebelled against some parts of it. 
Probably our greatest legacy from the English system is the common 
law, a system that prevails in every jurisdiction of the United States save 
Louisiana and, I would guess, in Canada save Quebec. And, of course, it was 
the common law process that gave birth to and brought to maturity the body 
of jurisprudence that passes under the head of tort law today — both in 
Canada and the United States. Those who were part of the British Empire 
in the 18th century and for periods thereafter were pretty much subject to 
the same body of tort law, with the London based House of Lords and Privy 
Council as the ultimate arbiters. Whether the country was England, Scot-
land, Ireland, Canada, or Australia, or the American colonies, there was in 
general one body of jurisprudence governing liability for personal injury and 
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property damage—sort of a portmanteau of tort law—for all the subjects 
of the realm. 
1.4 The Impact of Diverging Legal Systems 
In fact, it was not until relatively recently that countries such as Canada 
and Australia opted to end the right to petition the Privy Council to resolve 
tort and other issues, something that came about much more abruptly and 
violently in the United States some 200 years earlier. Had Canadians de-
clared their independence from Great Britain in 1776, the tort systems of our 
North American countries might have retained more similarities than they 
do. However, that is not what happened, with the consequence that the two 
systems began to diverge at the time of the American Revolution. Although 
similarities remain, they tend to reside in the basics ; and where the law has 
diverged, the more extreme examples tend to occur in the United States. 
I believe there is a fundamental reason for the latter. 
One of the obvious differences, which is clearly a legacy of the British 
system, is that today Canada, and for that matter Australia too, have federal 
systems of tort law, with their respective national courts of last resort, the 
Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia, possessing the 
final common law authority on the subject. The fact that Americans opted, 
at least at the outset, for a loosely associated confederation of state repu-
blican governments cast the die against any sort of federal tort law. Other 
than the few and limited powers originally assigned to the federal govern-
ment, all other powers were reserved to the states. Encompassed within 
these reserved powers were those matters that were traditionally governed 
by the common law, including legal actions for money damages which today 
pass under the head of torts. Although there was a period when the federal 
courts sought to exercise the right to determine the common law in tort 
cases that fell within their jurisdiction1, this did not endure2. Of course, an 
1. The federal courts in the United States promulgated their own brand of common law 
for tortious injury for almost a century in diversity cases under the doctrine of Swift v. 
Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842) (holding that federal courts exercising 
jurisdiction on the grounds of diversity of citizenship need not, in matters of general 
jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the State as declared by its highest court, but 
that they were free to exercise independent judgment as to what the common law of the 
State is or should be). 
2. Despite the system of limited jurisdiction for federal courts actually adopted in the United 
States Constitution, it was not until 1938 that the Supreme Court of the United States 
recognized that there was no authority under that document for a system of federal 
common law of torts or other areas of « general law » : Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938). 
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exclusive federal system was not to be, except for certain things such as 
providing for a common defense, and for good reason. 
Providing that the state courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over 
those matters generally left to the common law certainly stemmed from the 
political mood of the times. After all, the colonists had recently fought a war 
to oust a government exercising centralized control and there most defi-
nitely was little sentiment to install another to replace it, albeit one far more 
representative in form. Nonetheless, the reservation of tort law to the states 
was purely a by-product of a basic political decision exercised by the 
drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution. Had the colonists and Great 
Britain been able to reach a settlement short of war3, who knows what form 
of government the Americans would have set up or how their court system 
would have been configured. In fact, those in the United States might only 
look to you in Canada, their neighbor to the north, to see that there certainly 
was nothing intrinsic about the subject that would have prevented the 
American colonists from having a national or federal common law system, 
including the law of torts, had they so desired. Nonetheless, it is readily 
apparent today, although the two countries share a common heritage, that 
political forces have molded our respective governments so that in one there 
is more centralized control over developments in the tort system than in the 
other. Over time, this lack of centralized control explains, at least in my 
mind, some, if not much, of what has happened in the common law system 
in the United States in comparison with that in Canada, including develop-
ments with regard to tort awards for non-economic loss. 
2. Common Law and Common People 
2.1 Setting the Stage for Future Developments 
At the time of the American Revolution there is little evidence that tort 
law, such as it was, needed to be different, or for that matter was differ-
ent, from one jurisdiction to another. The same was also true in the main 
for some time thereafter4. As time passed and the frontiers of the nation 
3. Opinion among the colonists upon the subject of independence from England was much 
divided and a number of efforts were made to keep the colonies within the British realm. 
See P. MAIER, American Scripture : Making the Declaration of Independence, New 
York, Knopf Publ., 1997. 
4. As late as the first half of the 19th century, « torts » was not an autonomous branch of 
law in the United States, but was a collection of mostly unrelated writs. See G.E. WHITE, 
Tort Law in America, New York, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 8. Torts was not 
considered a discrete branch of law until the late 19,h century (Id., at p. 1). The first 
treatise on torts appeared in 1859 : see F. HILLIARD, The Law of Torts, Boston, Little, 
Brown and Co., 1859. 
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expanded westward, the settlers simply took the law that was familiar to 
their new surroundings. Except for what statutory law there was, the com-
mon law was the only law they knew, and the source for the latter was 
primarily Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. As more 
land was formally acquired, the United States Congress, as part of the 
organic act creating a new territory, would usually adopt the common law 
of England as the rule of law insofar as it was suitable. In turn, when a new 
state was created from a territory and admitted to the Union, it usually did 
the same thing, either as part of its constitution or by statute5. However, 
even in the absence of an express provision, it was assumed that the 
common law would prevail unless some legislation indicated otherwise6. 
Consequently, as civilization pushed further West and as each new state 
was created, the opportunities with regard to future developments in the 
common law multiplied and was pregnant indeed. In short, the stage was 
being set for the rich jurisprudential outpourings that eventually followed. 
2.2 Opportunities to Affect the Law 
Like Canada, the United States was populated by wave after wave of 
immigrants. However, unlike the situation prior to the American Revolu-
tion, increasingly these immigrants came from countries other than En-
gland. Moreover, as they immigrated they tended to locate in specific areas 
of the United States, so that ethnic and cultural traits were focused in a way 
to influence local institutions, including those of a political nature such as 
the legal system7. It was also the case that there were few formal require-
ments in the early days in this country for becoming a lawyer—in fact, 
almost none in the territories and frontier states8. In many instances, one 
only had to « read law » and submit to a perfunctory examination to qualify 
as a member of the bar9. This meant that there were meaningful opportuni-
ties to become lawyers. This was true not only for the common folk who, 
over time, gradually moved west in search of a better existence, but it was 
also the case for newer citizens who literally had just gotten off the boat10. 
Not only could they be lawyers, soon they became judges, since most judges 
at the state level achieved office through popular elections rather than by 
5. See W.F. WALSH, A History of Anglo-American Law, 2nd ed., Indianapolis, Bobbs-
Merrill, 1932, pp. 93-97. 
6. Ibid. 
7. See generally, J.W. HURST, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers, Boston, 
Little, Brown and Co., 1950, pp. 11-19. 
8. See L.M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, New York, Simon and Schuster, 
1973, pp. 275-278. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Id., at 549-561. 
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appointment11. And, finally, there was another very important factor that 
should not be overlooked. The right to trial by jury in civil disputes, as well 
as in criminal matters, was preserved with a vengeance in the constitutions 
of the new states, which meant that even those who were not lawyers had 
an important role to play in the legal system. 
These phenomena converged to bring an unparalleled infusion of peo-
ple with common values into the legal system in each state, states that 
contained in most instances vast expanses of land that contained rich 
resources that would eventually fuel the industrialization of the country. As 
the country transformed itself from an almost exclusively agrarian base, and 
concomitantly as manual labor gave way to machines, activity in general 
increased in an almost geometric progression. With this came the inevitable 
increase in accidents and the inherent toll on life and limb, all of which 
provided an unceasing diet of tort cases for the lawyers and courts to 
resolve. These developments occurred within the context of a society where 
Americans at all levels became increasingly enamored of and began to 
actually experience such New World privileges as individual freedom, so-
cial equality, and occupational mobility. And, if they did not experience it 
immediately, the ideal was still there to be sought. Of course, during this 
time there were, and still are, many other things, such as religious values, 
that also contributed, and still contribute, to the rich social fabric of the 
United States. In fact, there may be no other comparable period in history 
that parallels that which the average American experienced in the 19th and 
20th centuries—an experience that inevitably would be reflected in the 
development of legal doctrine. 
2.3 Laboratories for Experiment 
By 1912, there were 48 separate and independent common law jurisdic-
tions that were the originators and final arbiter of tort doctrine within their 
boundaries12. The courts of each jurisdiction were able to draw on, and 
11. Ibid. Even after more formal requirements for admission to the bar were imposed, the 
gatekeeping responsibility has largely become the task of law schools. Unless an appli-
cant graduates from an American Bar Association accredited law school, he or she is 
not eligible to sit for the bar examination in most states. Although there was a time when 
many American law schools refused to admit women and certain minorities, this was 
not true of all schools, especially those schools that offered night programs. In general 
American law schools have prided themselves in admitting anyone with the ability to 
succeed and that has been especially true since World War II. In the process, the English 
guild system was rejected. See J.W. HURST, op. cit., note 7, at pp. 276-294. 
12. Although Louisiana, like Quebec, had a civil law system, the District of Columbia was 
a common law jurisdiction. Thus, even though one of the 48 states had a civil law system, 
the District of Columbia brought the total to 48 common law jurisdictions in the conti-
nental United States. 
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clearly were in a position to be influenced by, courts in their sister jurisdic-
tions, but there was no overarching governmental institution in place to 
homogenize and mold tort doctrine into a single body of law. Moreover, 
although the fundamental precepts found in the Constitution of the United 
States governed the states, they were rarely invoked to limit the develop-
ment of tort doctrine. In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States tended 
to treat the states as laboratories for experiments in tort law and almost 
never found state tort doctrine wanting on constitutional grounds13. In 
short, the courts of each jurisdiction were left largely unfettered to provide 
a popular response as the need increased to formulate appropriate remedies 
for those injured in accidents. And, as the following summary of develop-
ments will attest, that response was not only quick in coming, but once it 
started it accelerated with each generation of litigants. 
3. The American Courts and Awards for Non-Economic Harm 
3.1 Early Cases and the Impact of the Industrial Revolution 
Awards of damages for non-economic loss, as well as for economic 
loss, under the common law, of course, predate the American Revolution. 
There are records of cases in England dating from the 17th and 18th centuries 
which seem to countenance such awards even though they were not explici-
tly approved by the courts14. The awards, however, were often not itemized 
and it is not easy to discern when claimants were first officially allowed to 
recover for such things as pain and suffering as a distinct category of harm, 
as compared to what might pass under the head of general damages. None-
theless, by the early 1800's both English and American courts were making 
reference to awards for « suffering » and « pain »15. It was not long thereafter 
that the Industrial Revolution ushered the newly emerged negligence action 
to the forefront of tort law, opening the court house doors to a much broader 
array of damage claims in general16. From this point on — with the ever 
13. See, e.g., Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 40 S.Ct. 68, 64 L.Ed. 133 
(1919) (per Holmes, J., holding that the Federal Constitution does not prevent a state 
from leaving the defense of contributory negligence to the jury in all cases, those in 
which it is a mere question of law as well as those in which it is a question of fact). The 
laissez-faire attitude still prevails. For example, it was only after many entreaties before 
the Supreme Court in a rare move finally applied the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to actually regulate awards of 
punitive damages in tort cases. See BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 
116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). 
14. See J. O'CONNELL and R.J. SIMON, « Payment for Pain & Suffering : Who Wants What, 
When & Why», 1972 U. III. L. Rev. 1, 90-91. 
15. Id., at 92-93. 
16. See G.E. WHITE, op. cit., note 4, at p. 16. 
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increasing opportunities for the courts and juries to pass on the issue— 
there has been a constant expansion of awards for non-economic loss, not 
only of those made in connection with a negligence action for bodily injury 
but also of those made independently of any bodily injury17. 
3.2 From Impact to Zone of Danger 
At first courts required that a claimant suffer some injurious physical 
impact in an accident before he or she could claim damages for non-eco-
nomic loss18, but it was not long before exceptions were recognized. The 
most common exception to the impact requirement involves the so-called 
« zone of danger» rule19. Although a claimant is not in any way the subject 
of physical impact, as long as he or she is situated so that a negligent actor's 
conduct creates an immediate risk of bodily harm to the claimant, a claim 
for emotional distress may be brought. Courts allowing such claims recog-
nized that they could be exaggerated and some might even be fraudulent, but 
went on to point out that the same thing could occur under the impact rule 
if the claimant sustained only trivial or minor bodily harm20. The courts that 
recognized this expanded right to recover for non-economic harm reflected 
a popular attitude, an attitude that they were created to resolve the rights of 
citizens in individual disputes, no matter that the awards would be specula-
tive and that the right to assert such claims might be abused21. Having 
side-stepped the physical impact hurdle, many courts saw no reason to stop 
there. 
3.3 Physical Manifestation Requirement and its Erosion 
Although most courts have now abandoned the physical impact rule in 
favor of the zone of danger rule, a split has developed among the various 
jurisdictions with the result that some jurisdictions have expanded the right 
to recover for emotional distress even further. Although injurious impact 
preceding emotional injury is no longer a general requirement for a claim of 
non-economic loss, most courts initially refused to permit recovery for 
emotional distress, such as fright or shock, alone. Instead, these courts 
17. Although recoveries for non-economic loss have long been recognized in the area of 
intentional torts (see W.P. KEETON et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 
5th ed., St-Paul, West Publishing Co., 1984, §§ 8-12), the most dramatic growth has 
occurred in negligence law. Thus, this article will focus on developments in the latter 
area. 
18. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). 
19. See, e.g., Batalla v. Stale, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961). 
20. Id., at 241, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37, 176 N.E.2d at 731. 
21. Id., at 242,219 N.Y.S.2d at 38, 176 N.E.2d at 731-32. An excellent review of the impact, 
zone of danger, and other rules to be mentioned can be found in Camper v. Minor, 915 
S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996). 
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insisted that where there has been no physical impact, a claimant cannot 
recover unless there is proof of some kind of objective physical manifesta-
tion of the distress occurring as a result of the exposure22. This, however, 
was a short lived requirement in some jurisdictions, as claimants continued 
to press the outer boundaries of the law. 
In response to this pressure, some courts have modified or diluted the 
physical injury or manifestation requirement in zone of danger cases, but 
have not formally abandoned it. These courts have merely required a lower 
level of proof. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
has held that it only requires that « plaintiffs must corroborate their mental 
distress claims with enough objective evidence of harm to convince a judge 
that their claims present a sufficient likelihood of genuineness to go to 
trial23 ». Under this type of test, evidence of severe headaches, occasional 
suicidal thoughts, sleep disorders, reduced libido, fatigue, stomach pains, 
and loss of appetite has sufficed as physical symptoms of emotional injury 
to send a case to trial24. Of course, there is hardly a lawyer worth his or her 
salt that could not produce some evidence of this nature. 
3.4 Abolition of Physical Manifestation Requirement 
Other courts have taken the full step in recognizing claims for emo-
tional distress by completely abolishing the rule that requires that some 
physical injury or manifestation result from the exposure to a negligently 
created risk of bodily harm because the claimant was in the zone of danger. 
These courts have emphasized that it is unfair to focus on a requirement of 
physical harm or physical manifestation as a way of determining whether or 
not a claim is genuine25. To do so, as one court said, permits recovery for 
22. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 757 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1985). 
23. Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 414 Mass. 129, 137-38, 605 N.E.2d 805, 810 (1993) (holding 
that, although temporary symptoms or mere upset or dismay, will not qualify as objective 
evidence, the claimant's sustained diarrhea was sufficient proof to establish a claim for 
emotional distress). 
24. See, e.g., Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640 
(1989). See also Silberstein v. Cordie, 474 N.W.2d 850, 857 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) 
(headaches, insomnia, loss of appetite and muscle tension for several months satisfied 
the physical harm requirement) ; Wrightw. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 414 N.W.2d 608 (S.D. 
1987) (symptoms of diarrhea, bitter taste, and regurgitating satisfied the physical harm 
requirement). 
25. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 
P.2d 813 (1980). Although Molien was not a « zone of danger» case in that it involved 
a husband's claim for emotional distress and loss of consortium based on a negligently 
incorrect diagnosis that his wife suffered from an infectious type of syphilis, the holding 
is not limited to any particular type of negligently induced emotional distress as long as 
it is severe. 
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emotional distress resulting from innocuous physical harm, while mechani-
cally denying claims of a more serious nature that might be proved valid 
through other types of evidence26. In addition, opined the court, the distinc-
tion between physical and emotional injury is not clearly delineated, and 
there is greater likelihood that the trier of fact will be able to separate the 
false from the genuine claims based on the circumstances involved when 
compared to their own experiences27. Thus, not only have courts abandoned 
the physical impact rule in favor of the zone of danger rule, some courts 
have liberalized the list of kinds of evidence that can be adduced to prove 
compensable non-economic loss. Important as these court decisions have 
been, they have not been the only expansive developments in the law 
regarding claimants' rights to recover for non-economic loss. 
3.5 The Bystander Cases 
In addition to the developments regarding non-economic loss dis-
cussed above, recoveries have been allowed for emotional distress where 
the claimant is neither physically injured nor in the zone of danger, but 
instead witnesses another close member of his or her family being seriously 
injured through the negligence of another. The latter type of case is known 
as a «bystander» case. At first, the right to recover in this of type of case 
was limited to the situation where the claimant, from a nearby position, 
personally observed the relative being injured in the accident28. It was not 
long, however, before some relatives who were not present at, but who 
subsequently came upon, the accident scene also were allowed to recover29. 
26. Id., at 929-30, 167 Cal.Rptr. at 838, 616 P.2d at 820. 
27. Id., at 930-31, 167 Cal.Rptr. at 838-39, 616 P.2d at 820-21. 
28. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (mother and sister 
observed vehicle strike and kill the deceased child as she tried to cross the road). In 
reaching its decision, the Dillon court relied heavily on the famous line of English cases 
beginning with Hambrookv. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. .41, ,he earllest case to recognize 
the right of a bystander, which also happened to be a mother fearing for the safety of 
her children, to recover for emotional distress even though not in any physical danger 
herself. 
29. See, e.g., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (holding that 
a complaint alleging that a mother who lived in the immediate vicinity of the accident 
and who went to the scene and witnessed her daughter lying injured on the ground stated 
a cause of action for the mother's death which resulted from the shock she experienced) ; 
Roitz v. Kidman, 913 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1996) (allowing recovery by a parent who does not 
actually see a child killed, but who sees the body immediately thereafter, but denying 
recovery if the parent sees the child at a later time, such as in the hospital). See also 
Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996) (holding, where truck driver sustained 
emotional distress after viewing body of negligent pedestrian whom his truck had struck, 
that negligent infliction of emotional distress claims should be analyzed under the general 
negligence approach, i.e., no differently from any other negligence case). 
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Although not all jurisdictions have embraced the result in the bystander 
cases and allowed claimants to recover, particularly if the claimant did not 
personally and contemporaneously observe the accident30, there are signs 
that other courts may be willing to go even farther in recognizing a right to 
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs are not only 
pursuing more and more claims in the physical injury and exposure areas 
—for example, claims to recover where an alleged exposure to some toxic or 
contaminated substance has caused them to fear that they may eventually 
suffer harm, such as cancer or AIDS, sometime in the future31 —but they 
also have branched out into areas where recoveries for consequential dam-
ages traditionally have not been countenanced at all. 
3.6 Duties Arising Out of Direct Relationships 
Perhaps the most surprising area of expansion for non-economic loss 
recoveries has come about in cases that do not involve risk of or actual 
physical injury, unlike the cases alluded to above which may be viewed as 
mere extensions of the physical impact rule to analogous areas of emotional 
impact. In the situations involving the « impact », « zone of danger », and 
« bystander » rules, there usually is no pre-existing relationship between a 
person who asserts a claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress and 
the individual who is alleged to have caused it. Or, even if there is, it is not 
the basis upon which the courts recognized the right to recover. There is 
another group of cases, however, that is different in that recovery turns on 
the existence of some pre-existing relationship that has been assumed by the 
parties or imposed on them by law. According to the courts, it is the 
relationship alone that creates a duty to protect a complaining party from 
unwarranted emotional distress. Some of these decisions appear to repre-
sent an even greater expansion of the law than those involving negligent 
infliction of physical harm and their progeny because they extend liability 
for emotional distress to situations that in a number of instances involve 
purely economic interests that arise out of a contractual relationship. Ar-
guably, this is a marked departure from the classic rule limiting damages for 
30. See Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814 (1989) (denying 
recovery to a mother who, upon hearing that her son had been struck by an automobile, 
rushed to scene, and found her bloody and unconscious child lying in the road). However, 
in Thing the Supreme Court of California did affirm its earlier position in Molien v. 
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, note 25, that, at least as to those claimants who 
could claim to be « direct victims » of emotional harm, both the physical harm and the 
accident or sudden occurrence requirements were eliminated : Thing v. La Chusa, at 
658-59, 257 Cal.Rptr. at 873, 771 P.2d at 822. 
31. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 
P.2d 795 (1993) ; K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995). 
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breach of contract announced nearly a century and a half ago32. Other 
relationships not involving purely economic interests involve more modest 
advances in the law regarding non-economic loss, but they, nonetheless, still 
serve to show the increasing importance that awards for such losses have 
come to play in our society. 
3.6.1 Professional Relationships 
Some of the cases allowing emotional distress recovery for negligent 
breach of a direct relational duty involve claims against those engaged in a 
profession33. One famous example involves a doctor and others who were 
sued by a woman and her husband for emotional distress when the woman 
was erroneously diagnosed as having contracted a contagious form of 
syphilis34. Not only has this case rightly been viewed as having created 
liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by 
physical injury35, but it also supports the proposition advanced by some 
courts that a relationship alone can create a duty to avoid inflicting emo-
tional distress upon another party, even though it is not done intentionally36. 
Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the area of the so-called tort of bad 
faith which has arisen in the context of insurance contracts. 
3.6.2 The Tort of Bad Faith 
In 1967 the Supreme Court of California, which until recently has been 
the most innovative American tribunal when it comes to tort law, created a 
new niche for emotional distress claims37. Citing a rather modest selection 
32. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854) (limiting damages for breach of 
contract to those reasonably in the contemplation of the parties at the time the bargain 
was struck). 
33. In addition to the recent cases dealing with professionals, there are two somewhat related 
special groups of cases that have long recognized that a recovery may be had for the 
negligent infliction of mental disturbance alone. Although the first is dated and the second 
occurs relatively infrequently, they too should be recognized as areas of liability that do 
not turn on the risk of physical harm to the claimant: (1) negligent transmission of a 
message by a telegraph company, especially one erroneously announcing the death of a 
close relative, which indicates on its face that mental distress will result and (2) negligent 
mishandling or treatment of corpses. See W.P. KEETON et al, op. cit., note 17, § 54, at 
p. 362. 
34. Molten v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 
(1980). 
35. See W.P. KEETON et al,, op. cit., note 17, § 54, at p. 364. 
36. For another case recognizing a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress 
that arose out of an employment relationship, and relying on Molien for authority, see 
Sacco v. High Country Independent Press Inc., 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411 (1995). 
37. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.. 66 Cal.2d 425, 58 Cal.Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173 (1967). 
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of precedents involving situations where claimants had been allowed to 
recover damages for emotional distress arising out of invasion of property 
rights, the Court in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.3S announced that a 
liability insurer owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to its insured in 
considering whether to settle tort claims made against its insured. In doing 
so, the court allowed an insured to collect an award for emotional distress 
where her liability insurance company had unreasonably failed to settle 
such a claim brought against her when it had the chance to do so39. Although 
it was not clear at the time how far reaching this decision would prove to be, 
it was not long before the California Court applied the same duty to the area 
of first-party, as compared to liability or what is sometime referred to as 
third-party, insurance. 
In 1973 the Supreme Court of California handed down the landmark 
decision of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.40. In deciding whether bene-
fits were owed under a fire insurance policy, the Court reiterated the 
principle that there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
all contracts of insurance and made it clear that a breach of this duty may 
give rise to an action in tort41. The rest, as they say, is history. Within two 
decades thereafter, over 30 states have embraced the tort of bad faith in 
insurance policy disputes42, and the end is not yet in sight. In addition to the 
situations in Crisci and Gruenberg, the former involving the duty to settle 
under a liability policy and the latter involving the duty to pay benefits under 
a first-party policy, courts are now beginning to recognize that a similar duty 
exists with regard to the obligation to provide a defense under a liability 
policy, and that non-economic loss may be recovered for breaches of the 
duty in this type of case too43. 
These decisions represent a very important development despite the 
fact that some of jurisdictions embracing the new tort have limited the 
38. Ibid. 
39. After the insured's liability insurer refused to accept the tort claimant's offer to settle 
for $9,000, which came within the insured's policy limits, the jury awarded the tort 
claimant and her husband $ 101,000. In addition to the serious financial problems suffered 
by the insured as a result of the judgment, the insured also suffered a decline in health, 
hysteria, and suicide attempts. In the trial by the insured against her liability insurer, she 
was awarded $25,000 for emotional distress, in addition to her economic loss, an award 
that was affirmed on appeal (ibid.) 
40. 9 Cal.3d 6, 566, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032 (1973). 
41. Id., at 574-75, 108 Cal.Rptr. at 485, 510 P.2d at 1037. 
42. See R.C. HENDERSON, «The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions 
After Two Decades », (1995) 7 Ariz. L. Rev. 1153. 
43. See, e.g., Smith v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1980), 20 
A.L.R.4th 1 (1983)) 
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action to intentional or reckless violations of the duty. This is so because a 
number of jurisdictions, including California, appear to allow emotional 
distress awards in bad faith cases where the conduct of the insurer may 
amount to nothing more than negligence44. And, of course, time will only tell 
what other relational interests will give rise to claims for emotional distress. 
If these and the other developments described thus far constituted the only 
expansions in this area of tort law, they surely would be remarkable enough, 
but when they are coupled with other simultaneous and related expansions, 
they are indeed astounding. 
3.7 Expansion of the Definition of Pain and Suffering 
3.7.1 The ATLA Influence 
Prior to World War II, the concept of pain and suffering was applied in 
a relatively narrow manner by the courts. Claimants were allowed to re-
cover for the physical discomfort and agony that they actually experienced 
and little more. In fact, there was almost no discussion in the cases regarding 
the elements that might be considered or the amount that might properly be 
awarded. This began to change in 1946 with the establishment of an orga-
nization by a group of claimants' attorneys that is now known45 as the 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA)46. This organization has 
enjoyed great success in enrolling new members and contains not only 
thousands of rank and file personal injury attorneys, but also is headed up 
by the leading members of the bar in that area. Moreover, it has developed 
educational materials and training programs, including clinics which are 
conducted by the most capable plaintiffs' lawyers in the United States. 
There is no question but that ATLA has had a tremendous impact on 
developments in general in tort law and that it has had a particularly 
dramatic effect on the number and size of awards for non-economic loss in 
these types of cases47. Almost certainly the law would have been expanded 
44. See R.C. HENDERSON, loc. cit., note 42, at 1156-59. 
45. The organization was originally known as the National Association of Claimants' Com-
pensation Attorneys (NACCA), but was later changed to the American Trial Lawyers 
Association (ATLA). The latter name subsequently was modified to its present form in 
settlement of a trade name dispute with the American College of Trial Lawyers. 
46. See J. O'CONNELL and R.J. SIMON, loc. cit., note 14, at 4. 
47. It has been argued that the phenomenal development of awards for pain and suffering 
is attributable to the fact that personal injury lawyers representing accident victims in 
the United States are customarily paid on a contingent fee. This fee normally ranges 
from one-third to one-half of the total recovery, depending upon the type and difficulty 
of the case. Since the American personal injury lawyer, it is said, is clearly in a position 
to profit greatly from an increased settlement or verdict, this has helped to provide the 
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by the judiciary in any event because non-economic harm does involve real 
and meaningful losses, particularly in an affluent and increasingly hedonis-
tic society. Nonetheless, the development has also been enhanced by the 
fact that almost all personal injury claims are tried to a jury in the United 
States, a right that is guaranteed not only under the federal constitution but, 
also, as mentioned earlier, in each state constitution. The result has been 
that trial lawyers have developed an impressive armament of tactics and 
techniques for imaginatively presenting evidence in an area of law that is 
truly protean. These creative efforts by trial lawyers to influence juries to 
return ever larger awards in turn has resulted in a host of cases expanding 
on the definition of pain and suffering. 
3.7.2 The Influence of Affluence 
In a hand-to-mouth society, pain and suffering does not rate that high 
on any scale of human values—mere survival being the main goal. In 
comparison, in an affluent society there is not only much more to lose in the 
way of economic matters, but the inability to enjoy the economic benefits 
of that society also looms larger. In short, disability takes on additional 
meaning when there are pleasurable alternatives. Consequently, it is only 
logical that pain and suffering has come to include any form of unpleasant 
emotional reaction to an injury or its consequences so long as it is proxi-
mately related to the tort in question48. Not only does it include such things 
as disfigurement and any resulting mental pain or embarrassment, but it also 
includes such negative emotional states as those associated with any terror 
the claimant felt at an approaching injury and the anxiety about the future 
course of an injury49. Apprehension and even guilt that comes with aware-
ness of impending death are compensable, as well as various forms of 
depression, anxiety, and hysterical or conversion reaction50. The results of 
personality changes, which may result in altered relationships with family 
members and friends are included51. In addition, it has more recently come 
to include the mere loss of pleasure as well as the actual sensation of pain 
or discomfort. 
incentive to not only press for new and expanded bases for awarding non-economic loss, 
but also for employing ever more imaginative ways of persuading jurors to return 
progressively larger verdicts. See J. O'CONNELL and R.J. SIMON, loc. cit., note 14, at 
4-5. 
48. For a more detailed discussion of the various elements that now go to make up this area 
of damages, see D.B. DOBBS, Law of Remedies, vol. 2, 2nd ed., St-Paul, West Publishing 
Co,, 1993, § 8.1 (4). 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid. 
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3.7.3 Loss of Enjoyment of Life 
Many courts now recognize that a claimant may recover for what 
plaintiffs' attorneys refer to as loss of enjoyment of life52. If the evidence 
warrants, a claimant is allowed to seek recovery for the fact that he or she 
can no longer engage in some favored activity even though it is not asso-
ciated with any physical pain itself. In fact, it has acquired a label of its 
own—hedonistic damages. Carried to its logical conclusion, according to 
arguments by claimants' attorneys, such awards should be allowed as a 
separate element of damages in addition to an award for pain and suf-
fering53. These arguments, if accepted, could lead—and it appears they are 
in part designed to do so—to an erosion of two general rules that have been 
fairly well settled in the United States until now. The first rule is that one 
has to be conscious of the pain or loss before a recovery may be had. The 
second is that, except for lost earning capacity and any actual emotional 
distress, no recovery may be had for the time that a claimant will not live 
because of an injury — the so-called lost years. Although it remains to be 
seen whether any significant number of courts will actually accept the 
« separate element » argument, there are at least two jurisdictions — New 
Jersey and West Virginia—that already have held that a comatose patient 
has a loss of enjoyment even though he was not aware and would never be 
aware of the loss54. If past experience is any basis for predicting the future, 
there is one thing for sure. We have not seen the end of developments with 
regard to recoveries for non-economic loss. 
4. Non-Economic Harm and No-fault Insurance 
4.1 General Concern and Attempts to Limit Awards 
My attempt to summarize developments in the law surrounding non-
economic loss in the United States are necessarily sketchy ; nonetheless, it 
serves to bring into relief the ever larger role that awards for pain and 
suffering have taken on as courts and juries reflect the values of our society 
through the common law process. The constant expansion of the areas in 
which recoveries are allowed and the more liberal definitions of pain and 
suffering, when coupled with the enhanced adroitness of plaintiffs' attor-
neys, have resulted in more and larger jury verdicts for non-economic loss, 
all of which has not gone without criticism. In recent years, there has been 
a movement by those aligned with the interests of defendants and their 
52. Id,, at p. 385. 
53. See, e.g., Kirk v. Washington State University, 109 Wash.2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987). 
54. Eyoma v. Falco, 247 N.J. Super. 435,589 A.2d 653 (App. Div. 1991) ; Flannery v. United 
States, 171 W.Va. 27, 297 S.E.2d 433 (1982). 
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liability insurers to legislatively curtail awards for non-economic loss. 
These efforts have largely involved attempts to place monetary limits on the 
amount of such recoveries and have met with some success, particularly in 
the area of medical malpractice55. Of course, the right to recover for pain and 
suffering has always loomed large in the debates over no-fault automobile 
insurance, a subject to which I now would like to turn. 
4.2 State No-Fault Movement 
In the words of Professors Robert E. Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell, the 
tort-liability insurance system for bodily injury victims of motor vehicle 
accidents « provides too little, too late » and what benefits there are, are 
«unfairly allocated, at wasteful cost, and through means that promote 
dishonesty and disrespect for law »56. This indictment, although issued over 
three decades ago, still rings true in all but a handful of jurisdictions in the 
United States. After Massachusetts enacted the first no-fault auto insurance 
plan, which went into effect on January 1, 1971, less than one-half of the 
states followed suit during the height of the movement57. Of these jurisdic-
tions, only two-thirds modified the tort system by disallowing in some 
manner claims for non-economic loss58. The other one-third merely pro-
55. For example, in 1975 California enacted its Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act 
(MICRA) which included a $250,000 cap on non-economic loss in medical malpractice 
cases. This limitation on recovery was upheld in a constitutional challenge in Fein v. 
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 211 Cal.Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665, appeal 
dismissed for want of federal question: 474 U.S. 892, 106 S.Ct. 214, 88 L.Ed.2d 215 
(1985). In addition to California, according to the American Tort Reform Association 
(ATRA) located in Washington, D.C., as of December 31, 1997, similar legislation with 
monetary caps that range from $250,000 to $1 million for non-economic loss in medical 
malpractice cases has been enacted in Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, 
Montana, Louisiana, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
Also, according to ATRA, limits ranging from $250,000 to $500,000 on certain types of 
non-economic loss in personal injury cases in general have been enacted in Alaska, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, and Oregon. 
However, the Supreme Court of Illinois recently declared the Illinois legislation uncon-
stitutional, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 I11.2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997), and 
the constitutionality of some of the other legislation has yet to be resolved. 
56. R.E. KEETON and J. O'CONNELL, Basic Protectionfor the Traffic Victim : A Blueprint 
for Reforming Automobile Insurance, Toronto, Little and Brown, 1965, p. 3. This book 
was the product of a study conducted by Robert E. Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell 
regarding ways of handling claims arising from automobile accidents. The study was 
funded by the Walter E. Myer Research Institute of Law, Inc. 
57. See R.C. HENDERSON, «No-Fault Insurance for Automobile Accidents: Status and 
Effect in the United States», (1977) 56 Or. L. Rev. 287. 
58. Those plans which eliminated the right to sue were of two types : (1) those that limited 
the right to sue for non-economic loss, i.e., pain and suffering ; and (2) those that not 
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vided enhanced first-party benefits without regard to fault without placing 
any limits on auto accident victims' rights to sue in tort59. And, of course, 
the remaining jurisdictions did even less to address the plight of motorists60. 
Although there have been a few no-fault enactments since the 1970's, about 
an equal number of states have repealed their plans, so that the situation at 
the state level remains about the same as it did 30 years ago. 
4.3 The National No-Fault Effort 
In addition to the activity within the state legislatures — or perhaps 
more accurately because of the general lack of success at that level — there 
was one serious attempt at the national level in the 1970's to require all 
states to adopt no-fault plans that would meet federal standards. This effort 
involved a very interesting cast of characters. 
The bill, which was entitled the «National No-Fault Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Act» (1974), not only was introduced, but it actually passed the 
Senate in May of 1974. The lead sponsor was Senator Warren Magnuson, 
the politically powerful Democratic chair of the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee. At the time, the President of the United States was none other than 
Richard M. Nixon, a man who, despite his misdeeds, accomplished much 
while in office. 
When Nixon took office in January of 1969, he appointed John Volpe 
to the office of Secretary of Transportation. John Volpe was the Governor 
of Massachusetts during the time a young and little known Representative 
— at least little known outside his Brookline district—to the Massachusetts 
Legislature introduced the first no-fault act in the country, the act that 
only limited the right to sue for pain and suffering, but also limited the right to sue for 
economic loss to the extent that one was entitled to collect no-fault benefits : Id. at 
290-292. Only two of these jurisdictions—Michigan and New York—adopted plans 
that come close to what Quebec has done in completely eliminating the right to sue in 
tort: Id., at 291-292. 
59. Id., at 289-290. 
60. It was about this time that states began to mandate that motorists carry certain levels 
of liability insurance and, in some instances, uninsured motorist coverage. Although this 
helped to assure some minimal level of compensation for motor vehicle accident victims, 
it did little to alleviate the serious inefficiencies of the fault-based tort system identified 
by Professors Keeton and O'Connell (see supra, text accompanying note 56) and 
repeatedly confirmed in later studies. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, Motor 
Vehicle Crash Losses and Their Compensation in the United States : A Report to the 
Congress and President, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971 ; U.S. DEP'T OF 
TRANSPORTATION, Compensating Auto Accident Victims : A Follow-up Report on No-
Fault Auto Insurance Experiences, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985 ; S.J. CAR-
ROLL et al., No-Fault Approaches to Compensating People Injured in Automobile 
Accidents, Santa Monica, Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 1991. 
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ultimately passed in 1970 and went into effect on January 1, 1971. That man 
was Michael Dukakis who subsequently became the Democratic nominee 
for President in 1988. Dukakis was working with then Harvard Law Profes-
sor Robert E. Keeton in achieving this milestone. Professor Keeton and 
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell had recently published their book, Basic Pro-
tection for the Traffic Victim (see supra, footnote 56). The preface to the 
book reveals that in 1965 Governor Volpe and Lieutenant Governor Elliot 
Richardson appointed a member of Richardson's staff to serve as their 
liaison representative to the study that resulted in the book. Although 
Governor Volpe actually opposed the adoption of the Massachusetts no-
fault bill introduced by Dukakis, he apparently viewed things differently 
once he joined the Nixon Administration in Washington. 
While John Volpe was Secretary of Transportation, the Department 
undertook the most massive and thorough study of the auto accident system 
in the United States, concluding that no-fault was preferable to the existing 
system. It is hardly likely that this study was undertaken without the 
approval of Volpe and others in the Administration, including President 
Nixon himself. Moreover, it was this study and support from the Depart-
ment of Transportation that was instrumental in leading the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to draft the Uniform 
Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act which was completed in 1972. 
And in turn, the Uniform Act served in many ways as the blueprint for the 
federal standards that the states would have to meet and that were contained 
in Senate Bill 354, the National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. 
Had the National No-Fault Act also passed the House of Represen-
tatives, is there any other evidence that President Nixon would have signed 
it ? Although one can only speculate about the answer, it is interesting that 
Richard Nixon, while a law student at Duke University in 1936, wrote an 
article on tort liability for auto accidents for the influential journal, Law and 
Contemporary Problems61. His article appeared as part of a symposium 
discussing, among other things, the sociology of compensation and the pros 
and cons of a no-fault system for auto accidents62. Whatever influence this 
may have had on him as President, as fate would have it, the Nixon Admin-
istration was awash in the Watergate scandal by 1974 and he resigned in 
August of that year, just a little over three months after the Senate passed 
Senate Bill 354. The companion bill was never seriously considered by the 
61. See R.M. NIXON, «Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation», 
(1936) 3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 476. 
62. See E. CORSTVET, R.M. NIXON et al, «Financial Protection for the Motor Accident 
Victim», (1936) 3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 465. 
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House of Representatives and the effort to enact no-fault legislation at the 
federal level in 1974 failed. 
What followed was a long drought through the 1980's as the no-fault 
auto insurance movement stalled at both the state and national levels. 
Consequently, in most states today, claims for injuries arising out of motor 
vehicle accidents remain exclusively within the tort system except to the 
extent these victims voluntarily carry some form of first-party insurance, 
such as medical payments coverage, to pay for their losses. This situation, 
however, may be on the verge of change. 
4.4 The Choice No-Fault Movement 
As we have entered the last decade of this century, Professor Jeffrey 
O'Connell and others have attempted to revitalize the no-fault movement in 
advocating that motorists should be given a choice as to the type of system 
that would determine their compensation rights when injured in an auto 
accident63. In fact, this concept is now popularly known as choice no-fault 
or the choice plan. Although only two states — Kentucky and Pennsylva-
nia—have adopted choice plans thus far, the last two Republican candi-
dates for President of the United States have endorsed the choice concept64. 
Moreover, legislation once again has been introduced in Congress—the 
Auto Choice Reform Act of 199765—in a bipartisan effort to implement a 
no-fault insurance plan for motorists. This time, however, unlike the legis-
lation introduced in Congress in the 1970's, the federal plan would not 
mandate that states limit the right to sue for pain and suffering66 ; rather it 
63. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL and R.H. JOOST, «Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault 
and No-Fault Insurance», (1986) 72 Va. L. Rev. 61 ; J. O'CONNELL et al., «Consumer 
Choice in the Auto Insurance Market», (1993) 52 U. Md. L. Rev. 1016 ; J. O'CONNELL 
et al., « The Costs of Consumer Choice for Auto Insurance in States Without No-Fault 
Insurance», (1995) 54 U. Md. L. Rev. 281 ; J. O'CONNELL et ai, «The Comparative 
Costs of Allowing Consumer Choice for Auto Insurance in All Fifty States», (1996) 
55 U. Md. L. Rev. 160; See also, J. O'CONNELL and C.B. KELLY, The Blame Game: 
Injuries, Insurance, and Injustice, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1989. 
64. Both President George Bush in his bid for re-election in 1992 and Senator Robert Dole 
in his campaign for the presidency in 1996 made auto insurance reform an issue when 
they endorsed the concept of giving motorists the choice of participating in a no-fault 
auto insurance plan. See « Bush Proposes Modified No-Fault Auto Insurance to Cut 
Premiums», Buffalo News (17 Oct. 1992) at A5; «Dole's Plan Would Create New 
Options on Auto Insurance », N. Y. Times (8 Aug. 1996) at Dl. Dole, while still a Senator, 
was one of the co-sponsors of the bipartisan federal Auto Choice Reform Act of 1996, 
S. 1860, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). 
65. Auto Choice Reform Act, S. 625, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). 
66. The federal bill that passed the Senate in 1974 did not require that the states completely 
eliminate the right to sue for pain and suffering resulting from auto accidents. Suit could 
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would let consumers elect whether to give up the right to sue for such 
awards in exchange for being compensated for economic loss on a no-fault 
basis. A Congressional study estimates the legislation would reduce auto 
insurance premiums 32 percent nationwide, which translates into a savings 
of $243 a year for the average driver and a 48 percent, on average, savings 
for low-income drivers67. Over five years, the plan would make available a 
total of $246 billion in savings68. In addition, it would address other pro-
blems in the tort-liability insurance system such as speeding compensation 
to accident victims and ensuring that more of the premium dollar is returned 
in the form of benefits instead of being used to administer the system. It is 
all so appealing, but will it pass ? 
4.4.1 Framing the Issue 
As in any political debate, framing the issue is critical. The importance 
of this fact was demonstrated in the debates during the no-fault wars of the 
1970's, much of which debate centered on the right to recover for pain and 
suffering69. No-fault opponents, primarily consisting of the members of the 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), were mainly responsible 
for defeating plans that limited the right to sue for pain and suffering. In fact, 
it was during this period that ATLA became what it is today—a major 
political force at both the state and national levels70. And this transforma-
be brought when, among other exceptions, the accident resulted in « (A) death, serious 
and permanent disfigurement, or other serious and permanent injury ; or (B) more than 
ninety continuous days of total disability ». S. 354, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 206 (a) (5) 
(1974). 
67. JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE REPORT, The Beneftts and Savings of Auto-Choice, 
Washington, United States Congress, 1997. 
68. Ibid. 
69. These efforts were also aided by the fact that the three major insurer trade associations 
at the time—American Insurance Association (AIA), American Mutual Insurance Al-
liance (AMIA), and National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII) — were not 
able to unite behind one specific no-fault plan. The AIA and NAII, organizations that 
represented many large stock insurance companies, favored more ambitious no-fault 
plans with greater limitations on the right to sue in tort, while the AMIA, an organization 
that included many small mutual insurance companies, wanted more modest no-fault 
benefits and, concomitantly, fewer restraints on the right to sue. 
70. Prior to the no-fault movement, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) 
mainly served its membership through educational programs and materials. Its offices 
were located in Cambridge, Massachusetts within a block of the Harvard Law School. 
Although it had no relation with Harvard, it did establish a foundation in the name of 
the Law School's former dean, Roscoe Pound, which still supports a number of activities 
involving issues in law and public policy. After the no-fault movement began, the ATLA 
offices were moved to Washington, D.C., at which time the organization became much 
more involved in the political process, particularly with regard to any attempt to limit 
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tion came about even though none of the plans actually proposed in that era 
eliminated the right to sue for pain and suffering altogether71. The right to 
sue for non-economic loss was always retained for the serious injury cases 
and, in many instances, there was no effective limitation on such claims at 
all72. 
Much of the success of the ATLA forces hinged on their ability to 
frame the debate in a manner that focused on what a potential auto accident 
victim might lose in not being able to sue for pain and suffering under a true 
no-fault plan. Arguments that focused on the possibility of suing for painful 
injuries were much more effective than arguments that focused on certain 
benefits for economic loss. If the choice presented was one of being able to 
recover at all for an aching back versus quicker and certain payment for 
economic loss, with somewhat smaller premiums, it was not hard for the 
listener to identify more with the former than the latter situation. The fact 
that, once the claimant's attorney's contingent fee and litigation expenses 
were deducted, the claimant would end up with very little, if any, of an 
award for pain and suffering never quite resonated with many people. In 
short, the motoring public rarely appreciated that they would be better off 
under a well designed no-fault system than they were under the tort-liability 
insurance system. Consequently, for the most part, the right to sue for pain 
and suffering survived, and not only did it survive, as evidenced by the 
earlier summary of legal developments, it appears to have taken on even 
more importance in the meantime. Given the current situation, will the fact 
that motorists will be given a choice make any difference this time around ? 
claimants' rights under the tort-liability insurance system, whether it be at the state or 
national level. 
71. Although the American Insurance Association, one of three politically active insurer 
trade associations, initially took the position that a pure no-fault auto insurance system 
was to be preferred, it later endorsed the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations 
Act promulgated by the national Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
in 1972. The Uniform Act preserved the right to sue for non-economic loss in cases 
involving death, significant permanent injury, serious permanent disfigurement, or more 
than six months of total disability, but only if the damages exceeded a statutory figure. 
The Act suggested that the statutory figure be not less than $5,000. See Uniform Motor 
Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, 14 U.L.A. 35 § 5 (a) (7) (1990). 
72. Many acts, especially in the early stages of the movement, eliminated the right to sue 
for pain and suffering only when the medical expenses suffered in an auto accident did 
not exceed a monetary threshold, $500 being a common figure. Other acts used a rather 
amorphous verbal threshold describing the types of injury for which a claim for pain 
and suffering could be maintained (see R.C. HENDERSON, loc. cit., note 57, at 290). In 
either case, these thresholds were easily circumvented and proved inadequate in elimi-
nating claims for pain and suffering in the less-than-serious injury cases. 
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4.4.2 Will Offering a Choice Make Any Difference ? 
Now nearly three decades have elapsed since the last major effort to 
bring no-fault auto insurance to America's motorists, an effort that largely 
failed over the issue of the right to sue for pain and suffering—a right that 
no-fault proponents only argued should be modified, not eliminated. Yet the 
current federal Auto Choice plan comes very close to accomplishing the 
latter for those accident victims who elect the no-fault option73. This has 
already rekindled the arguments of plaintiffs' attorneys and some consumer 
advocates that such a plan for auto accident victims takes away too many 
benefits and that it promises more than it can deliver74. In other words, they 
argue, it is such a bad deal that people should not even be given the right to 
choose for fear that they will act out of ignorance. And, of course, what is 
really at stake is the right to sue for pain and suffering. 
Whether or not the federal Auto Choice Reform Act will be enacted is 
problematic because the ATLA forces and other self-styled consumer ad-
vocates have proved formidable. They have worked effectively to defeat 
ballot initiatives, for example in Arizona and California, in the past few 
years and can be expected to marshal every resource available to oppose the 
current no-fault effort at the federal level, albeit this effort would merely 
allow people to choose between fault and no-fault systems. Moreover, even 
if the opponents are not successful in defeating the proposed choice plan in 
Congress, a serious question still exists—will the President sign it75 ? Only 
time will tell, but in the process the public's reaction to the proposal could 
well turn on how the debate is framed and, if the opponents have anything 
to do with it, the issue will be the right to sue for non-economic loss. Déjà 
vu! 
73. A no-fault electee retains the right to sue for pain and suffering under the federal Auto 
Choice Reform Act in only three situations : when the electee is injured by a tortfeasor-
motorist who is operating his or her vehicle while unlawfully uninsured or under the 
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs or the tortfeasor-motorist intentionally injures the 
electee. S. 625, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6 (c) and (d) (1997). 
74. « Proposed Auto Insurance Law Would Reduce premiums ; But Trial Lawyers Oppose 
Eliminating Option to Sue for Pain and Suffering», Bait. Sun (20 Jan. 1998) at 7A. 
75. Duringhis 1992and 1996 presidential campaigns, President Clinton's largest single source 
of campaign contributions was lawyers, many of whom were trial lawyers. In the 1992 
presidential primary campaign, when he needed the money the most, he received nearly 
$3 million from this source, see A. DEVROY and H. DEWAR, « Product Liability Pits 'Two 
Goliaths' ; Business Wins a Senate Battle, but Veto to Give Lawyers Their Day », Wash. 
Post (21 Mar. 1996) at AOl. In 1996, by the end of June, with four months to go before 
the election, lawyers had donated nearly $4 million to the Clinton campaign. See R. MAR-
CUS, « Study Traces Sources of Record Fund-Raising by Clinton and Dole », Wash. Post 
(23 August 1996) at A09. 
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Conclusion 
As we approach a new century, it is discouraging, to say the least, that 
we are presently no better off in the United States than we were 30 years 
ago when it comes to compensation for auto accident victims. Motor vehicle 
liability insurance—the most inefficient of the private mechanisms for 
transferring and distributing losses — is now required for motorists in 
nearly all the states. Efficient no-fault plans that will compensate auto 
accident victims in more instances and at higher levels for economic loss 
than the tort-liability insurance system exist in only a handful of jurisdic-
tions. The no-fault movement for the present has stalled at the state level 
and the chances of federal action are problematic at best. A compulsory 
pure no-fault plan for auto accidents, such as Quebec's, appears to be out of 
the question and now the opponents of no-fault are girding for the battle to 
preclude motorists from even being given a choice, all in the name of 
preserving the right to sue for pain and suffering. Yet, the 21st century may 
still witness the development of a more enlightened system for compen-
sating auto accident victims, although it may be the result of indirect action 
by the federal government. 
Eventually we will have some type of national health-care system in the 
United States. Whether this occurs through some type of federal effort, like 
the plan proposed by the Clinton Administration or some derivation, it will 
happen because times have changed. Prior to and even for sometime after 
World War II, there was no real expectation in this country that a person 
was entitled to health care. If you could pay for it, you could get the best, 
but if you could not, you got only what you could afford or whatever the 
medical profession would provide for free. Health insurance coverage did 
not exist, at least as we know it today. Kaiser had only recently begun 
— mainly in the wartime shipyards — what we would today call a health 
maintenance organization or managed care. Employer sponsored health 
insurance plans were yet to emerge in large numbers. There was no general 
feeling that health care was a basic human right on the same level as food. 
That is not the case today and it will probably never be the case again, at 
least in this country. People have definite expectations about their need for 
and right to health care and these expectations are growing, not diminishing. 
Once health care is accepted as an inalienable, guaranteed right, it is 
going to make less and less sense to permit tort victims to sue third parties 
for their medical bills. It ultimately will be viewed as a « right » that every-
one but the personal injury bar and liability insurers can well do without. 
I do not have time, nor is this the place, to pursue it here, but I am confident 
that we would lose nothing of real importance if we eliminated the re-
dundancies that presently exist in the tort-liability insurance system and 
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health-care insurance programs. In fact, by doing so, I believe we could 
actually gain a great deal in the way of efficiency and benefits. 
If one is no longer allowed to sue in tort for medical expenses otherwise 
compensated, it may follow that it is not worth fighting over who was at 
fault with regard to work loss either, particularly if the loss arises from an 
auto accident. In addition, one might observe that if most of the tort award 
for non-economic loss goes to compensate the claimant's attorney anyway, 
we may as well quit fighting over fault in a lot of situations and utilize a 
first-party insurance system for all out of pocket or economic loss. Not only 
could more people be compensated and to a greater degree for the same cost, 
but it could be accomplished faster and in a less aggravating manner. Thus, 
it is entirely possible that the movement for universal health care could 
significantly impact the tort-liability insurance system over the long haul 
and that the federal government could play an important role in the process. 
In the meantime, the people of Quebec enjoy the benefits of a pure no-fault 
auto insurance system while we in the United States continue to wait. 
